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James Moliterno | John Keyser 
Why Lawyers Do What They Do (When Behaving Ethically) 
 
Abstract.  Since the early 1990s, when David Wilkins published his 
influential paper “Who Should Govern Lawyers” in the Harvard Law Review, 
legal ethics scholars and professors have paid attention to the range of 
processes and devices that govern lawyer behavior.  This Article will report on 
the results of a study currently underway that seeks to provide empirical 
evidence to answer the question posed in this Article’s title: Do lawyers train 
staff in confidentiality preservation because they fear bar discipline?  Because 
they fear malpractice liability?  Because they must comply with malpractice 
liability carrier demands?  Because they honor client confidences for their own 
value and wish to protect them?  Because the market forces them to do so?  
Because it is the right thing to do?  The same, or similar, sets of questions may 
be asked about establishing conflict check procedures, devising their 
marketing to stay within norms, charging reasonable fees, and other 
professional ethics-related actions by lawyers.  To gather data on these issues, 
the authors conducted a survey of the bars of Florida and Virginia and present 
on the findings. 
Authors.   James E. Moliterno is the Vincent L. Bradford Professor of Law 
at Washington & Lee University School of Law, and serves in a leadership role 
in W&L’s third year curriculum reform.  For twenty-one years prior to 
joining the W&L faculty in 2009, he was the Tazewell Taylor Professor of 
Law, Director of the Legal Skills Program, and Director of Clinical Programs 
at the College of William & Mary.  Professor Moliterno was the 2012 
recipient of the Rebuilding Justice Award from the Institute for the 
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Advancement of the American Legal System (IAALS) in recognition of his 
career-long legal education reform work.  He is the author or co-author of ten 
books including The American Legal Profession in Crisis: Resistance and 
Responses to Change (Oxford Univ. Press 2013) and of numerous articles on 
legal ethics and legal education.  He has engaged in substantial international 
legal ethics and legal education reform work in Serbia, Armenia, Georgia, the 
Czech Republic, Kosovo, Slovakia, Spain, Japan, China, Indonesia and 
Thailand.   
     John Keyser earned a B.S. and M.S. degree from Virginia Tech in 
Sociology with concentrations in Criminology and Quantitative Methods.  
He taught in and coordinated the Criminal Justice program and was the 
Assistant Director of the Center for Community Research at Roanoke 
College. He was the founder and President of BKW Research Group, a social 
and marketing research firm in Virginia.  He moved to Washington and Lee 
in 1997 where he served most recently as the Associate Dean for 
Administration.  In his capacity as the Associate Dean, John oversaw 
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I.     INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the early 1990s, professional responsibility courses in law 
schools focused almost exclusively on the ABA model ethics codes and 
sometimes local state codes.  Even at that, such courses had come a long 
way since the days when they were an exercise in “chanting the Canons” 
for no credit.1 
In the late 1970s, as part of the post-Watergate credibility-restoration 
scramble, the ABA mandated that law schools require a professional 
responsibility course for graduation.2 
Prior to any Watergate revelations, there was a watered down draft of 
section 302 in existence.3  However, the draft that existed before the full 
Watergate affair came to light did not mandate that law schools require a 
course in lawyer ethics; it merely required that law schools offer such a 
course, along with several others.4  The amendment to the draft resolution 
came during the February 1973 floor debate5 when a motion brought by 
the State Bar of Arizona was passed in the House of Delegates.  Thus, the 
weak draft that existed before Watergate became a much stronger mandate 
by floor action in 1973, by which time there were new Watergate 
revelations emerging almost daily.  Although it did not begin hearings 
until May, the Senate Select Committee (chaired by Sam Ervin) was 
formed on February 7, 1973.6  A month earlier still, when Judge Sirica 
opened the Watergate burglars’ trial on January 7, federal investigators 
already knew of the CREEP (Committee to Re-Elect the President) slush 
fund used to finance illegal activities against Democrats.7  The convictions 
 
1. See Lawrence A. Dubin, Professionalism Among Lawyers: The Law School's Role, 68 MICH. 
B.J. 850, 851 (1989) (recalling the academic futility of attending classes related to legal ethics). 
2. JAMES MOLITERNO, THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN CRISIS: RESISTANCE AND 
RESPONSES TO CHANGE ch. 5 (Oxford 2013). 
3. 98 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 351, 354 (1973). 
4. See id. at 353–54 (“The law school shall offer: (i) instruction in those subjects generally 
regarded as the core of the law school curriculum, (ii) training in professional skills, such as 
counseling, the drafting of legal documents and materials, and trial and appellate advocacy, (iii) 
instruction in the duties and responsibilities of the legal profession.”). 
5. See House Disapproves UMAVRA, Supports the Exclusionary Rule, and Adopts New Law School 
Standards, 59 A.B.A. J. 384, 390 (1973) (“The house then voted to amend paragraph 302 in that 
form, so that subparagraph (a) (iii) as adopted reads: and provide and require for all student 
candidates for a professional degree instruction in the duties and responsibilities of the legal 
profession.”). 
6. Chronology: 1973, WATERGATE.INFO., http://watergate.info/chronology1973-chronology 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2014). 
7. The Watergate Files, The Watergate Trial: Overview, GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY & MUSEUM, 
http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/museum/exhibits/watergate_files/content.php?section=1&page=
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of McCord and Liddy were entered on January 30.8  As far back as August 
1, 1972, the Washington Post reported that funds meant for CREEP had 
been deposited in a Watergate burglar’s account.9  Regarding the floor 
amendment adoption in 1973, ABA President Robert Meserve said that 
this amendment evidenced the ABA’s “desire that there be greater law 
school emphasis on the teaching of professional responsibility.”10  
Although it is fair to say that the major revelations were yet to come when 
the ethics course requirement was adopted in February 1973, the lawyer-
involvement in Watergate was clearly exposed.  “In August 1974, in the 
wake of Watergate, the following specification was added to the Standard, 
‘Such required instruction need not be limited to any pedagogical method 
as long as the history, goals, structure and responsibilities of the legal 
profession and its members, including [the ABA Code of Professional 
Responsibility] are all covered.’”11 
That move, along with the contemporaneous rapid development and 
adoption of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam (MPRE), gave 
new credibility to the course, long a stepchild of the rest of the 
curriculum.12 
Casebooks and course books proliferated when only few had existed 
prior to the ABA accreditation move.13  Careers were adjusted and formed 
 
a (last visited Mar. 31, 2014). 
8. Id. 
9. Brief Timeline of Events, WATERGATE.INFO, http://watergate.info/chronology/brief.shtml 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2014). 
10. Robert W. Meserve, President’s Page, 59 A.B.A. J. 327, 327 (1973). 
11. Robert MacCrate, Educating a Changing Profession: From Clinic to Continuum, 64 TENN. 
L. REV. 1099, 1123 (1997) (citing SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. 
BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUC. AND PROF’L DEV.—AN EDUC. CONTINUUM 262, 263 (Report of the 
Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992)). 
12. Id.  See generally Paul T. Hayden, Putting Ethics to the (National Standardized) Test: Tracing 
the Origins of the MPRE, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1299 (2003) (tracing the major currents that spurred 
the MPRE’s development). 
13. The original casebook in the field was ELLIOT CHEATHAM, CASES AND OTHER 
MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION (Edmund M. Morgan et al. eds., 1938).  Within a few 
years of the accreditation requirement, the books proliferated.  A few of the more prominent books 
include: GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: ETHICS AND 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Davis L. Shapiro et al. eds., 1981); ELIZABETH DVORKIN ET AL., 
BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND 
PROFESSIONALISM (Colum. U. Sch. of L. Project for the Study of Application of Humanistic Educ. 
in L. et al. eds., 1980); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION (1985); ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., 3d ed. 1989); THOMAS L. SHAFFER 
& R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE (1977); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, 
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (1986).  In 2014, there are scores more. 
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for new faculty who were pressed into service to teach the new course, 
which was outside their core expertise.14 
Standard 302 is broad in terms of teaching methodology and narrow in 
terms of subject matter focus.  Coverage was required of the “history, 
goals, structure and responsibilities of the legal profession and its members, 
including [the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility].”15  There was 
no mention of the various other controls on lawyer conduct, such as 
malpractice liability, litigation sanctions, contempt of court, and so on.16  
The main focuses, beyond history and structure, were the provisions of the 
ABA Model Code—the dominant model for lawyer discipline 
enforcement. 
The narrow subject matter focus was natural: after all, the American 
legal profession has long claimed self-governance through the state bars 
and supreme courts’ enforcement of the profession-drafted ethics codes.  
Even in the face of evidence to the contrary, the profession has clung to 
this image of lawyers governing lawyers, reporting their fellows’ 
misdeeds.17  Naturally, the ABA’s accreditation standard focused on the 
self-governance aspects of the law governing lawyers. 
That was the state of the ethics-teaching art until the early 1990s when 
the almost exclusive focus on the ABA codes and the disciplinary process 
changed as a result of David Wilkins’ groundbreaking article, Who Should 
Regulate Lawyers?18  The article laid out the reality that the ethics codes 
 
14. Thomas D. Morgan and Ronald D. Rotunda, for example, were beginning faculty 
members at the University of Chicago Law School when the accreditation requirement was adopted.  
They were asked to teach the new lawyer ethics course and launched prominent careers in the field, 
with their problem-based course book becoming one of the leading authorities.  See generally 
THOMAS D. MORGAN ET AL., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 11th ed. 
2011) (discussing problems in professional responsibility). 
15. Robert MacCrate, Educating a Changing Profession: From Clinic to Continuum, 64 TENN. 
L. REV. 1099, 1123 (1997) (citing SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. 
BAR ASS’N, LEGAL EDUC. AND PROF’L DEV.—AN EDUC. CONTINUUM 262, 263 (Report of the 
Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992)). 
16. See id. (mentioning only the specific requirement for professional values). 
        17. Compare Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in 
Federal Court and How Should the Rules be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460, 461–62 (1996) 
(“Lawyers refer to their profession as ‘self-regulating,’ but this term is misleading as well as wishful.”), 
with Dana A. Remus, Out of Practice: The Twenty-First Century Legal Profession, 63 DUKE L.J. 1243, 
1250–51 (2014) (advancing that the “bar’s system of self-regulation [has] balanced lawyers’ 
competing duties to clients, the state, and the public” and furthermore that the bar has 
“demonstrated how its system of self-regulation balanced lawyers’ tripartite duties in furtherance of 
rule-of-law values”). 
18. See generally David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 
(1992) (exploring how traditional attorney disciplinary agencies “have been joined by a number of 
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and the disciplinary process were but one piece of what causes lawyers to 
behave as they do, and perhaps in some areas of governance, just a small 
piece.19  The article analyzed malpractice and other liability sources that 
have very different sets of motivators both for the lawyer being disciplined 
and the aggrieved party.20  For example, while the disciplinary sanctions of 
disbarment and suspension are grotesquely harmful to the lawyer, they are 
very rare incidents.21  Furthermore, they produce nothing more than 
satisfaction for the aggrieved person or entity.  In part, that explains why 
the sanctions are so rare: aggrieved parties are not motivated to make 
complaints.22  Indeed, corporate aggrieved parties appear to regard the 
disciplinary process as a waste of time and prefer to fire lawyers who harm 
their interests or file civil claims that have the potential to produce 
damages.23  In part, as a result of the type of clientele for large firm 
lawyers, the disciplinary process is more prominently a device for policing 
the conduct of small firms and solo practitioners.24 
Wilkins wrote the wonderful kind of article that causes readers to say, 
“of course, how could I have missed that?”  It resonated so deeply that a 
raft of others followed in its footsteps.25 
 
other systems designed to detect and deter unethical conduct”). 
19. See id. at 809–11 (providing a detailed analysis of the regulation of lawyers). 
20. See id. at 830–35 (analyzing sources of liability and their motivational basis for different 
actors). 
21. Id. at 806 n.22, 829 n.121. 
22. See id. at 829 n.121 (“In such cases, in exchange for disciplinary counsel’s promise not to 
seek either suspension or disbarment, the lawyer would agree to forego some of the elaborate due 
process protections that currently make most disciplinary proceedings so time consuming and 
expensive.”).  
23. See id. at 828 n.113 (proclaiming that “aggrieved clients find disqualification motions and 
civil suits ‘more attractive’ than the disciplinary system”), 828 n. 116 (“Because corporate clients have 
so little incentive to report their lawyers, it is not surprising that these lawyers are rarely subject to 
professional discipline.  The number of elite lawyers from major corporate firms who have ever been 
disciplined is exceedingly small.”). 
24. See id. at 832 n.134 (“The vast majority of malpractice claims are filed against solo 
practitioners or lawyers in very small firms.”). 
25. The article has been cited at least 283 times.  See WESTLAW KEYCITE CONTENT, 
http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?cite=105+Harvard+Law+Review+801+&rs=WLW13.10&v
r=2.0&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&sv=Split&fn=_top&mt=208 (last visited Mar. 31, 2014) (showing 
where Wilkins’ article has been cited).  The following is a list of notable authors who wrote 
specifically based on the article.  See generally Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct 
Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 460, 470–80 (1996) (proposing a third alternative for a uniform set of rules for professional 
conduct in federal courts); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. 
REV. 721 (2001) (discussing the reality of prosecutor discipline); see also Benjamin Hoorn Barton, 
Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the  Justifications for Entry and Conduct 
Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429 (2001) (comparing the justifications for entry and conduct 
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Once the professional responsibility professoriate had its eyes opened, 
courses began to expand into teaching malpractice liability, civil litigation 
sanctions (such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11), and discovery 
sanctions, contempt, reversal of convictions for prosecutorial misconduct, 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and other areas.  Some courses 
expanded further than the law to treat subjects such as the control of 
insurance companies over insurance defense lawyers—who, after all, 
actually represent their insured—and even the control exercised by 
malpractice insurance carriers over the lawyers they insure.  The MPRE 
developed modestly as well, expanding in 1999 to cover “questions of 
professional responsibility aris[ing] in the context of procedural or 
evidentiary issues, such as the availability of litigation sanctions or the 
scope of the attorney–client evidentiary privilege . . . .”26 
The course books increased also and began to cover malpractice liability, 
litigation sanctions, lawyer–client evidentiary privilege and work-product 
doctrine, ineffective assistance of criminal defense counsel, and prosecutor 
misconduct resulting in conviction reversal.27 
Knowing more about why lawyers do what they do will provide 
disciplinary bodies, courts, bar associations, and the public with important 
information.  For example, we may be able to discover more about 
allocating the proper attention and resources in furtherance of a more 
efficient regulation of lawyers.  Perhaps because the Wilkins insight was so 
compelling, very little empirical evidence to support its assertions has been 
sought.  This Article and the survey on which it reports embody such an 
effort.  Though much more should be done, we try to provide a starting 
point to answer the question: Why Do Lawyers Do What They Do?  Why 
do lawyers create conflict-check procedures, train staff to protect client 
 
regualtions with the current state of regulations); James E. Moliterno, Practice Setting as an 
Organizing Theme for a Law and Ethics of Lawyering Curriculum, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393 
(1998) (exploring the need for centralized themes in the substantive law). 
26. NAT’L CONF. OF BAR EXAM’RS, 2013 MULTISTATE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
EXAMINATION INFORMATION BOOKLET 10 (2013).  See also Paul T. Hayden, Putting Ethics to the 
(National Standardized) Test: Tracing the Origins of the MPRE, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1299, 1303 
(2003) (“Questions of professional responsibility arise in the context of procedural or evidentiary 
issues, such as the availability of litigation sanctions or the scope of the attorney–client privilege 
. . . .”). 
27. For further review of these course books, among many, see STEPHEN GILLERS, 
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS (Vicki Been et al. eds., 8th ed. 2009); 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING (Robert C. Clark et al. 
eds., 5th ed. 2010); JAMES E. MOLITERNO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS (4th ed. 2012); LISA G. LERMAN & PHILLIP SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW (Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012); THOMAS D. MORGAN ET AL., 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 11th ed. 2011). 
1 MOLITERNO_FINAL_GERMANO_CLEAN 6/24/2014  10:48:13 AM 
2014] Why Lawyers Do What They Do 9 
confidences, exercise caution in managing client funds, protect client 
information, and refrain from overcharging clients? 
II.     THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT AND ITS DISTRIBUTION 
We set out to ask lawyers why they do what they do when they follow 
ethical norms.  We enlisted the assistance of the Virginia State Bar and the 
Florida State Bar.  While neither would sponsor nor endorse the research, 
they did provide the list of emails of currently licensed Virginia and 
Florida lawyers and granted us permission to use the lists. 
We designed the survey instrument to be easy to complete, non-
threatening, and likely to produce useful information.  (The survey 
instrument we used is reproduced in Appendix A.)  We described the goal 
of the survey as follows:  
The goal of this survey is to explore the motivation of lawyers for acting 
ethically.  In short, when lawyers behave ethically, why do they do so?  All 
responses will be anonymous and will never be linked back to the individual 
respondent.  The survey is being conducted for academic purposes only and 
will not be shared with any state bar or agency.  This survey is not being 
funded by any state bar or agency.  If you have any concerns or questions, 
feel free to contact one of the researchers . . . .  
We instructed the participants as follows:  
For each of the following behaviors, distribute 100 points to represent the 
relative importance of each reason why you engage in the behavior or 
practice.  If you do not engage in the behavior (e.g., do not have conflict 
check procedures), leave the column blank.  The column of percentages for 
each question you answer should sum to 100%.  
We then asked about lawyer behaviors.  We chose the following topics 
because they are issues that implicate considered choices rather than in-
court, split-second decisions: 
 
1. Having conflict-check procedures 
2. Training staff to be sensitive to confidentiality issues and such 
3. Maintaining proper client trust accounts 
4. Not overcharging clients 
5. Protecting client information 
6. Using case management or other tools to meet filing and other 
deadlines 
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And for each activity, we gave the following options as motivators for 
the behavior: 
 
_____%  To avoid disciplinary sanctions 
_____%  To avoid malpractice liability 
_____%  To satisfy the requirements of your malpractice carrier 
_____%  To avoid judicial and other litigation sanctions 
_____%  To retain the continued business of your clients 
_____%  To attract new clients by word of mouth from satisfied clients 
_____%  To do the right thing without regard for other consequences 




We then asked a series of demographic and practice-orientation 
questions to enable us to parse the data by size of practice, specialty of 
practice, age, and gender.  And finally, because we provided different links 
for the Florida and Virginia lawyers, we enabled ourselves to examine 
whether there are consequential differences between those two groups. 
We initially sent an email to each recipient with a link to Survey 
Monkey where the survey would reside.  Unfortunately, the return was 
quite low, in part because a significant number of recipients mistrusted the 
email as possible spam.  We regrouped and sent the email again, this time 
directly from our Washington & Lee email address through a campus 
service for sending mass emails.  Eventually, we received 347 responses 
from Virginia lawyers and decided to confine our study to this group.28 
As anticipated with shotgun email lists, some of the email addresses did 
not hit their mark.  Some produced auto replies indicating that the 
intended recipient had moved or retired from law practice.  Some 
produced personal responses from recipients indicating that they were in 
business or government settings making the survey’s questions inapt. 
III.     THE RESULTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
A. Respondents by Age, Gender, Type of Practice 
Respondents were well distributed by age, quite close to national 
 
28. Because Professor Moliterno has been on the faculty of Virginia law schools (William & 
Mary and Washington & Lee) since 1988, it is likely that some Virginia survey recipients are his 
former students. 
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distributions.  Five percent might be classified as young lawyers (under 
30), which is close to the number in the general lawyer population (4%).  
Thirty-seven percent might be described as mid-career (between 30–49) 
and the largest number 57.9%, were over fifty.  The ABA breaks down the 
age categories in a slightly different way, but again, the numbers are quite 
close.  Thirty-five percent of American lawyers are between age 30 and 
44.29  Sixty-two percent are over 44.30 
Almost two-thirds (64.6%) of respondents were men and just over one-
third were women (35.4%).  This is a reasonable reflection of the gender 
demography of today’s profession (70% men, 30% women in 2005, with 
the trend line indicating that the national numbers are closer to our survey 
numbers in 2014).31 
Respondents well represented various law practice sizes.  Respondents 
from small practices (1–5 lawyers) accounted for 58% of respondents.  
Nineteen percent came from practices of 6-25 lawyers, and 22.7% came 
from law firms of over 25 lawyers.  Again, the ABA data collection breaks 
the groups slightly differently, but once again, the respondents to our 
survey are distributed quite closely to the national distribution.32  Sixty-
three percent of American lawyers practice in groups of 1–5 lawyers; 12% 
practice in groups of 6–20; and 26% practice in groups of more than 
twenty lawyers.33 
B. General Observations from the Data 
1.  Because we asked respondents to assign percentages to as many 
motivating factors as they wished to identify, two measures matter in 
evaluating their responses.  First, it is important to know how often a 
particular reason was chosen by a respondent, no matter what the 
percentage of motivation they assigned.  And second, it matters, perhaps 
more, to know the weighted response that was assigned by the group to a 
particular motivating factor.  So, for example, of the 321 respondents who 
answered Question 1 regarding conflict-check procedures, 235 (73% of 
respondents) identified avoidance of discipline as one of their motivating 
factors and 270 (84% of respondents) identified doing the right thing as 
 
29. ABA, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS (2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/lawyer_demographics_2013.authcheck
dam.pdf. 




1 MOLITERNO_FINAL_GERMANO_CLEAN 6/24/2014  10:48:13 AM 
12 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 4:2 
one of their motivating factors.  But the average weight given to avoiding 
discipline was about 20%, while the average weight given to doing the 
right thing was about 50%, so the weighted score for the two factors was 
4743 (about twenty points times 235 respondents who listed this 
motivating factor) and 13568 (about fifty points times 270 respondents 
who listed this motivating factor) respectively, making doing the right 
thing arguably 2.9 times as important as avoiding discipline.  So while 
doing the right thing motivates only 11% more respondents than avoiding 
discipline, it motivates them as a group much more powerfully.  The 
weighted-motivation analysis will be emphasized question by question in 
this paper. 
2.  Overall, “doing the right thing” was the most powerful single 
motivator of conduct, although the combination of all legal sanctions was 
more powerful still.  On every topic, doing the right thing was by far the 
greatest weighted motivator, averaging 44% of the motivation across the 
six questions.  Except for Question 6, regarding meeting deadlines, where 
both malpractice and litigation sanction motivators were at their peak, the 
doing the right thing motivation was close to the equal of all other 
motivations combined.  As expressed a number of times in the written 
comments, our respondents believe that lawyers should do the right thing 
for their clients without regard to the sanctions that may be available.  This 
finding and the observation that market forces account for the second 
highest motivation (17% overall) calls into question the role of law.  Thus, 
the actual “law” is well less than half (about 32% in our survey) the total 
motivation for lawyers to charge reasonable fees, meet deadlines, protect 
confidences, and avoid conflicts of interest. 
3.  A large number of respondents identified “another reason [not listed 
among the choices]” as a motivating factor.  The only way to evaluate these 
other reasons is to read the written responses that identify them.  Here, it 
appears that much of the time, the respondents have actually elaborated on 
one or more of the listed reasons.  For example, many respondents who 
identified “another reason” as their motivation for having conflicts-check 
procedures suggested that if they failed to catch a conflict early on, they 
would eventually need to withdraw to the detriment of themselves and 
their clients.34  Of course the reasons they would have to later withdraw 
 
34. One respondent said, for example,   
Because I will have to withdraw.  For example, it’s not fair to me or the client to go into a 
matter without knowing that I can finish it.  If I find in the middle of a matter that there is a 
conflict, I’m out of there and it doesn’t help anybody.  It happened once when two separated 
parents with different last names each wanted to be the guardian for their adult handicapped 
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would be to avoid discipline, avoid malpractice, etc.  Thus, these 
respondents blended their responses by elucidating their reasoning rather 
than by parsing the percentage owing to the reasons we listed in the survey. 
Others, who identified the “another reason” motivator, simply restated 
in their own words a factor we had listed on the survey.  One, for example, 
listed as the “other reason,” “I use my belief in virtue and morality.”  This 
reason might as well have been captured by a positive response to “doing 
the right thing.”  Another identified “Important to comply with rules of 
ethics” as the “other reason,” which might be a proxy for avoiding 
discipline, but might also have been a generalized response that many of 
our listed factors were at play for this respondent. 
Still others saw the question in terms slightly different than we 
intended.  For example, a few identified mandates of superiors as their 
“other reason” for using conflicts checks.  “Complies with my firm policy,” 
and “A basic must-do” were listed as “other reasons.”  Our goal was to get 
at the reasons that underlie why it is a firm policy or a basic “must-do.”  
These respondents did not go underneath the mandates of others. 
Although a significant number of respondents identified “another 
reason,” overall they gave little weight to those other reasons.  As indicated, 
often the other reason was no more than the aggregate of the available 
reasons on the survey.  As a result, responses of “another reason” have been 
factored out of the findings in the remainder of this paper. 
4. The fear of discipline does vary by the lawyering activity, and in ways 
that suit predictions.  For many activities (i.e., conflict checks, training 
staff, meeting deadlines, and protecting confidences), fear of discipline 
provides a modest 12 or 13% of the motivation to behave ethically.  But 
for maintaining client trust accounts, an activity that is monitored by the 
bar association and that produces especially harsh disciplinary 
consequences, the discipline-avoidance motivation leaps to double the 
usual (24%).  On the other end, regarding overcharging clients, where the 
bar discipline has been, historically, rare, the discipline-avoidance 
motivation dips to an almost non-existent 3%. 
 
child.  I gave each their money back from my trust account, then had to scramble to make 
expenses.  They have never followed through with the matter. 
 
     See generally Survey Results (on file with the author) (evaluating the answers given by various 
respondents).  
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C. Question by Question, Some Predictable Results Regarding the Measure of 
 Concern for Discipline 
Question 1.  Conflict check procedures have become a staple of law 
practice, especially private practice.  But accepting that nearly all lawyers 
engage check procedures, what motivates them to do so?  About 73% 
identify avoiding discipline as a factor, and on average they weigh that 
factor at 15% of their motivation.  Even more identify a malpractice-
related motivation, with a combined weight of 19%.  Litigation sanctions 
appear to account for 9% of the motivation while market-related 
motivations amount to 11% of the motivation.  By a substantial margin, 
doing the right thing provides the greatest motivation-weight at 42%. 
Question 2.  Lawyers are responsible for training their staff in 
confidentiality protection.35  Under the disciplinary rules, lawyers can have 
liability for the failure to provide reasonable supervision.36  Under 
malpractice law, lawyers can have liability for negligent breaches by staff.37  
Few litigation sanctions relate to confidentiality breaches by staff.  The 
motivation-weights seem to reflect the law’s allocations regarding staff 
breaches of confidentiality.  Thirteen percent of the motivation appears to 
come from discipline-avoidance; an almost identical 14% comes from 
malpractice concerns, and only 6% from the fear of the unlikely litigation 
sanctions.  Here, market forces appear to be at play, accounting for 18% of 
the motivation-weight.  Again, doing the right thing motivates more than 
anything else at 45%. 
Question 3.  Trust account violations account for some of the most 
grave disciplinary consequences.38  Further, because trust accounts are 
subject to bar audits, the likelihood of discovery and pursuit by bar 
 
35. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 18 (2014) (“A lawyer must act 
competently to safeguard information relating to the representation of a client against inadvertent or 
unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of 
the client or who are subject to the lawyer’s supervision.”).  For further discussion, see Model Rules 
1.1, 5.1, and 5.3. 
36. See generally id. R. 5.1 (“Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers”); 
Id. R. 5.2 (“Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer”); Id. R. 5.3 (“Responsibilities Regarding 
Nonlawyer Assistants”). 
37. See Tegman v. Accident & Med. Investigations, Inc., 30 P.3d 8, 13 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) 
(“As long as the paralegal does in fact have a supervising attorney who is responsible for the case, any 
deficiency in the quality of the supervision or in the quality of the paralegal’s work goes to the 
attorney's negligence, not the paralegal’s.”). 
38. Irene M. Ricci, Client Trust Funds: How to Avoid Ethical Problems, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 245, 247 (1998) (“Violations of trust account rules are one of the most common ethical 
violations brought before disciplinary boards.”). 
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authorities is high.39  By contrast, clients and courts rarely find out about 
trust account violations unless the bar authorities have ferreted them out in 
the first instance.  Unsurprisingly, discipline-avoidance is the primary 
motivation regarding this topic, at 24%—almost double its motivation on 
most other topics.  Also predictably, fear of litigation sanctions on this 
topic is a very modest 5% of the total motivation, and market-related 
reasons likewise are at a low point of 7%.  Protection of trust accounts is 
such a fundamental expectation, that presumably lawyers do not regard 
themselves at any market advantage by doing what is expected of all 
lawyers as a basic requirement.  Doing the right thing remains the 
strongest motivation at 40%, but on this topic it is well below twice the 
disciplinary avoidance motivation (40–24%) while on every other topic, it 
is close to three times the motivation and, in one instance, seventeen times 
the motivation. 
Question 4.  Refraining from overcharging clients presents the most 
unusual set of motivation-weights.  Avoiding discipline, avoiding 
malpractice and litigation sanctions combined amount to a mere 7% of the 
motivation-weight.  The bar has historically been disinterested in policing 
lawyers for charging too much,40 except in cases of fraudulent billings.41  
Malpractice liability and litigation sanctions for overcharging would be 
rare.  However, the market takes up the motivation-slack for the other 
three, accounting for more than a third (34%) of the total motivation-
weight.  Doing the right thing by not overcharging, a wrongful activity 
that is unlikely to be discovered, is more than half the total motivation 
(51%). 
Question 5.  Protecting client information is a core lawyer function.  
Here, more than on any other topic, lawyers say they protect client 
information because it is the right thing to do (53% of the motivation-
weight, overall average 44%).  Other factors are close to their overall 
averages (discipline avoidance 12%, overall average 12%; malpractice 
 
39. Id. at 247–48 (“In addition, in 1993, the ABA adopted the Model Recordkeeping Rule 
making Model Rule 1.15 more explicit.  Some jurisdictions have specific recordkeeping 
requirements, including such measures as authorization for an audit or other verification of a lawyer 
trust account.”). 
40. Gabriel J. Chin, Scott C. Wells, Can a Reasonable Doubt Have an Unreasonable Price? 
Limitations on Attorneys’ Fees in Criminal Cases, 41 B.C. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (“[T]he authors have 
found no clear evidence that even one civil lawyer has ever been disciplined simply for charging a fee 
which was too high.”). 
41. Id. (“[L]awyers are frequently disciplined for improprieties in connection with fees, such as 
misleading a client about how much a matter will cost, doing unnecessary work or lying about work 
performed.”). 
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avoidance 10% overall average 13.5%; litigation sanctions 5%, overall 
average 6%; and market-reasons 17%, overall average 17%). 
Question 6.  Maintaining procedures for meeting deadlines implicates 
litigation sanctions more than the other topics, with missing court 
deadlines being predictable ways of drawing court sanctions for delay, for 
obstructing discovery, for missing filing deadlines and the like.  Not 
surprisingly, litigation sanctions reach their peek as a motivator on this 
topic (11%, almost double its average motivation of 6%).  Avoiding 
discipline and market reasons are close to their overall averages at 12% and 
16% respectively.  Malpractice motivations, a likely consequence of 
missing deadlines, similar to litigation sanctions, reaches its peek on this 
topic (21% of the motivation weight compared to its average of 13.5%).  
Doing the right thing absorbs the loss of motivation from the peeks of 
malpractice avoidance and litigation sanction avoidance, falling to by far its 
lowest level, 32%, still the single greatest motivator on this as on every 
other topic. 
D. Differences by Age, Gender, Practice Size and Type 
Additional statistical tests were run on the data to determine if there are 
significant differences in responses based on age, gender, practice size and 
whether the lawyer is a litigator or non-litigator. 
The sampling frame for the respondents was provided by the Virginia 
State Bar and contained upwards of 6,000 email addresses.  Many of those 
emails, however, were no longer valid and resulted in undeliverable 
messages.  The first wave of surveys went out in November and a follow-
up to non-respondents was sent in December.  At the end of data 
collection, we had received 347 valid responses.  The independent variables 
were firm size, gender, age, and practice area.  The dependent variables 
were the series of motivations42 for engaging in specific behaviors.43  The 
two measures asking about attracting clients were combined into a 
“market” motivation and the two measures asking about malpractice were 
combined. 
We analyzed the data using a one-way ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) 
 
42. For example, “avoid disciplinary sanctions,” “avoid malpractice liability,” “satisfy the 
requirements of our malpractice carrier,” “avoid judicial and other litigation sanctions,” “retain the 
continued business of our clients,’ “attract new clients by word of mouth from satisfied clients,” and 
“do the right thing without regard for other consequences.” 
43. For example, conflict checks, training staff, client trust accounts, not overcharging clients, 
protecting client information, and using case management software. 
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between groups.44  We tested for the assumption of homogeneity-of-
variance using Levene’s test.45  We examined Welch and Brown-Forsythe 
when the assumption was not met.46 
The statistically significant differences are reported on the following 
tables.  Other differences in the response data lacked statistical significance. 
 
Table 1: Litigator vs. Non-Litigator 
 
Dependent Independent N Mean SD Sig. 
CONFLICT_D_SANCTION NonLitigator 38 8.84 11.481 
 Litigator 107 15.71 19.311 .010 
CONFLICT_JL_SANCTION NonLitigator 38 4.21 6.527 
 Litigator 107 9.71 14.448 .002 
TRAINING_JL_SANC NonLitigator 38 2.37 4.612 
 Litigator 107 6.65 11.594 .002 
TRUSTS_MALPRACTICE NonLitigator 38 8.45 13.192 
 Litigator 107 15.59 20.848 .017 
TRUSTS_RIGHT NonLitigator 38 48.50 38.936 
 Litigator 107 32.40 37.552 .031 
OVERCHARGING_RIGHT NonLitigator 38 64.68 35.362 




38 1.71 4.073 
 Litigator 107 4.83 9.303 
.006 
CASE_MG_JL_SANCTION NonLitigator 38 2.89 6.939 
 Litigator 107 12.12 18.519 .003 
 
 
44. See Engineering Statistics Handbook – 1.3.5.4 One-Factor ANOVA, NAT’L INST. OF 
STANDARDS AND TECH. – INFO. TECH. LABORATORY, http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/ 
eda/section3/eda/section3/eda354.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2014) (explaining that one-factor 
ANOVA determines whether one factor has a significant effect on multiple groups of data). 
45. See Engineering Statistics Handbook – 1.3.5.10 Levene Test for Equality of Variances, NAT’L 
INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH. – INFO. TECH. LABORATORY, http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/ 
handbook/eda/section3/eda35a.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2014) (“Levene’s test is used to test of k 
samples have equal variances.  Equal variances across samples are called homogeneity of variance.  
Some statistical tests, for example the analysis of variance, assume that variances are equal across 
groups or samples.  The Levene test can be used to verify that assumption.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
46. Welch is reported in the summary tables. 
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Table 2: Firm Size 
 
Dependent Independent N Mean SD Sig. 
TRUSTS_RIGHT 1–5 199 39.96 37.648  
 6–25 66 23.98 33.027 .003 
 26+ 78 29.36 38.058  
OVERCHARGING _RIGHT 1–5 199 50.75 38.383  
 6–25 66 32.44 35.694 .002 
 26+ 78 43.95 40.348  
 
 
Table 3: Gender 
Dependent Independent N Mean SD Sig. 
TRAINING_MARKET Male 221 13.97 21.039 
 Female 121 20.59 27.559 .022 
TRAINING_RIGHT Male 221 43.45 35.755 
 Female 121 35.07 35.828 .040 
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Table 4 : Age 
Dependent Independent N Mean SD Sig. 
 CONFLICT_JL_SANCTION <30 17 19.71 20.499  
 30–49 126 9.07 12.447 .010 
 50+ 197 6.41 9.714  
 CONFLICT_RIGHT <30 17 17.06 27.332  
 30–49 126 36.98 35.490 .003 
 50+ 197 42.41 34.197  
TRAINING_JL_SANC <30 17 14.00 13.537  
 30–49 126 7.74 11.614 .001 
 50+ 197 3.91 7.754  
TRAINING_RIGHT <30 17 18.76 28.554  
 30–49 126 39.40 36.399 .008 
 50+ 197 43.21 35.769  
TRUSTS_MALPRACTICE <30 17 27.65 23.791  
 30–49 126 11.32 15.651 .032 
 50+ 197 12.24 17.639  
TRUSTS_JL_SANCTION <30 17 12.94 15.110  
 30–49 126 5.17 9.122 .044 
 50+ 197 3.94 8.374  
TRUSTS_RIGHT <30 17 13.24 22.426  
 30–49 126 31.75 37.539 .001 
 50+ 197 38.45 37.795  
OVERCHARGING_RIGHT <30 17 17.94 30.724  
 30–49 126 43.55 39.589 .001 
 50+ 197 49.62 37.926  
CLIENT_INFO_MALPRACTICE <30 17 21.12 16.583  
 30–49 126 9.21 13.017 .025 
 50+ 197 9.59 13.965  
CLIENT_INFO_JL_SANCTION <30 17 13.94 12.602  
 30–49 126 5.43 9.299 .003 
 50+ 197 3.57 7.823  
CLIENT_INFO_RIGHT <30 17 25.41 27.998  
 30–49 126 51.84 35.814 .001 
 50+ 197 54.63 36.983  
CASE_MG_MALPRACTICE <30 17 10.29 12.805  
 30–49 126 13.62 17.474 .001 
 50+ 197 21.77 24.861  
CASE_MG_JL_SANCTION <30 17 16.94 18.767  
 30–49 126 11.06 17.214 .043 
 50+ 197 7.62 13.274  
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1.  Not surprisingly, litigators responded somewhat broadly with greater 
sensitivity to the litigation-sanction motivation.  They also responded with 
slightly less sensitivity to the do-the-right-thing motivation. 
On four of the six topics, they responded that they were motivated by 
litigation sanction to a greater degree than non-litigators.  One likely 
explanation is that they practice in court settings and naturally have more 
concern for the obviously greater likelihood of experiencing litigation 
sanctions than the non-litigators.  The significance score for these 
differences is high (.002, .002, .003, and .006). 
On two of the six topics, they expressed less sensitivity for doing the 
right thing than non-litigators.  The two topics, managing trust accounts 
and overcharging, may be less closely related to their litigation functions 
than the other four topics.  The significance score for these two differences 
is much more modest than the four litigation sanction differences (.021 
and .031). 
2.  Only two sets of responses varied significantly by firm size, with 
small-practice lawyers favoring the do-the-right-thing response on the 
managing trust accounts and overcharging topics.  
3.  The gender-related differences were quite modest.  Women 
respondents had a slightly heightened sensitivity to market forces, but only 
as related to the single topic of training staff.  Additionally, they had a 
slightly reduced sensitivity to doing the right thing with respect to only the 
same topic, training staff.  In light of the age difference on the same topic 
with older lawyers favoring the “do-the-right-thing” response, this result 
may be explained by the relatively younger population of women in the 
group of respondents and the bar generally.  The gender differences were 
of no particular note in the end, meaning the there was almost no 
statistical significance to the responses given based on gender. 
4.  The most significant and broad response differences were found 
based on the age of the respondents.  By significant margins and with high 
significance scores, older lawyers say they are motivated more by doing the 
right thing and younger lawyers say they are motivated by the range of 
legal sanctions, including discipline, malpractice, and litigation sanctions.  
These differences were not confined to a few of the six topics questioned, 
but instead applied to each and every one of the six, although the sharpness 
of the difference was more pronounced in some topics and less in others. 
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IV.     CONCLUSION 
It appears that lawyers care more about avoiding discipline in 
predictable areas, such as maintenance of trust accounts, than in most 
areas.  By contrast, they seem to care very little about bar discipline in areas 
of historical non-enforcement, such as fees.  They seem to evaluate the 
likelihood and gravity of discipline consistently with general knowledge 
about the application of discipline in some areas covered by the codes more 
than other areas. 
Overall, malpractice avoidance may be no greater motivation than 
discipline, but in predictable areas, it is the substantially greater motivator.  
Likewise, litigation sanctions are a modest motivator except in areas most 
likely to produce them. 
The market for clients is a more powerful motivator than any law-
related motivator, and doing the right thing is by far the greatest single 
motivator of ethical conduct. 
All in all, lawyers appear to behave quite rationally, being motivated by 
the law and the control devices most likely to be triggered by particular 
categories of misconduct. 
Gender and firm size appear to have little or no effect on the responses.  
By contrast, the litigation or non-litigation nature of practice, and 
especially age, do appear to make significant differences in the responses.  
Older lawyers appear to be more motivated by doing the right thing and 
younger lawyers more on various legal sanctions. 
The findings from this survey match well the predictions that would be 
made by most legal ethics teachers and scholars.  Our hope is that these 
findings will spur further research. 
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Appendix A 
The goal of this survey is to explore the motivation of lawyers for acting 
ethically.  All responses will be anonymous and will never be linked back 
to the individual respondent.  The survey is being conducted for academic 
purposes only and will not be shared with any state bar or agency.  This 
survey is not being funded by any state bar or agency.  If you have any 
concerns or questions, feel free to contact one of the researchers . . . 
For each of the following behaviors, distribute 100 points to represent 
the relative importance of each reason. The column of percentages for each 
question should sum to 100%. 
 
1. Having conflict check procedures 
_____%  To avoid disciplinary sanctions 
_____%  To avoid malpractice liability 
_____%  To satisfy the requirements of their malpractice carrier 
_____%  To avoid judicial and other litigation sanctions 
_____%  To retain the continued business of their clients 
_____%  To attract new clients by word of mouth from satisfied clients 
_____%  To do the right thing without regard for other consequences 
_____%  Another reason not listed about (please specify)___________ 
Comments: 
__________________________________________________________ 
2. Training staff to be sensitive to confidentiality issues and such, 
_____%  To avoid disciplinary sanctions 
_____%  To avoid malpractice liability 
_____%  To satisfy the requirements of their malpractice carrier 
_____%  To avoid judicial and other litigation sanctions 
_____%  To retain the continued business of their clients 
_____%  To attract new clients by word of mouth from satisfied clients 
_____%  To do the right thing without regard for other consequences 
_____%  Another reason not listed about (please specify)___________ 
Comments: 
__________________________________________________________  
3. Maintaining proper client trust accounts 
_____%  To avoid disciplinary sanctions 
_____%  To avoid malpractice liability 
_____%  To satisfy the requirements of their malpractice carrier 
_____%  To avoid judicial and other litigation sanctions 
_____%  To retain the continued business of their clients 
_____%  To attract new clients by word of mouth from satisfied clients 
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_____%  To do the right thing without regard for other consequences 
_____%  Another reason not listed about (please specify)___________ 
Comments: 
__________________________________________________________ 
4. Not overcharging clients 
_____%  To avoid disciplinary sanctions 
_____%  To avoid malpractice liability 
_____%  To satisfy the requirements of their malpractice carrier 
_____%  To avoid judicial and other litigation sanctions 
_____%  To retain the continued business of their clients 
_____%  To attract new clients by word of mouth from satisfied clients 
_____%  To do the right thing without regard for other consequences 
_____%  Another reason not listed about (please specify)___________ 
Comments: 
__________________________________________________________ 
5. Protecting client information 
_____%  To avoid disciplinary sanctions 
_____%  To avoid malpractice liability 
_____%  To satisfy the requirements of their malpractice carrier 
_____%  To avoid judicial and other litigation sanctions 
_____%  To retain the continued business of their clients 
_____%  To attract new clients by word of mouth from satisfied clients 
_____%  To do the right thing without regard for other consequences 
_____%  Another reason not listed about (please specify)___________ 
Comments: 
__________________________________________________________ 
6. Using case management or other tools to meet filing and other 
deadlines 
_____%  To avoid disciplinary sanctions 
_____%  To avoid malpractice liability 
_____%  To satisfy the requirements of their malpractice carrier 
_____%  To avoid judicial and other litigation sanctions 
_____%  To retain the continued business of their clients 
_____%  To attract new clients by word of mouth from satisfied clients 
_____%  To do the right thing without regard for other consequences 




Please provide us some information about yourself to aid in our analysis 
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of the motivations for ethical conduct. 
7. Which of the following best describes your legal occupation or 
classification? 
 □ Sole practitioner 
 □ Partner/shareholder 
 □ Associate 
 □ Managing partner 
 □ Practitioner with one or more associates 
 □ Of counsel 
 □ State government attorney 
 □ Local government attorney 
 □ Federal government attorney 
 □ Judge 
 □ Corporate counsel 
 □ Legal aid/legal service 
 □ Other position (please specify) __________________________ 
8. What is the total number of attorneys in your firm or office? 
 □ One attorney 
 □ 2 to 5 attorneys 
 □ 6 to 10 attorneys 
 □ 11 to 25 attorneys 
 □ Over 25 attorneys 
9. What is your primary practice area? 
 □ General (no one area greater than 50% of practice) 
 □ Bankruptcy 
 □ Business/corporate 
 □ Civil litigation – defense 
 □ Civil litigation – plaintiff 
 □ Criminal – defense 
 □ Criminal – prosecution 
 □ Estate planning 
 □ Family law 
 □ Government lawyer (non-criminal) 
 □ Immigration 
 □ Intellectual property/patent 
 □ Labor/employment 
 □ Real estate/land use/environmental 
 □ Tax 
 □ Workers’ compensation 
 □ Other (please specify) _________________________________ 
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10. Gender 
 □ Female 
 □ Male 
11. Age 
 □ Under 30 
 □ 30-39 
 □ 40-49 
 □ 50-59 
 □ 60 or above 
 
Appendix B 






















32100 15% 19% 9% 11% 42% 
Question 
2 
31400 13 14 6 18 45 
Question 
3 
30100 24 15 5 7 40 
Question 
4 
31200 3 2 2 34 51 
Question 
5 
33800 12 10 5 17 53 
Question 
6 
30500 12 21 11 16 32 
Overall  13 13.5 6 17 44 
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